In their account of passive euthanasia, Garrard and Wilkinson present arguments that might lead one to overlook significant moral differences between killing and letting die. To kill is not the same as to let die. Similarly, there are significant differences between active and passive euthanasia. Our moral duties differ with regard to them. We are, in general, obliged to refrain from killing each and everyone. We do not have a similar obligation to try to prevent each and everyone from dying. (...) In any case, to be morally obliged to persist in trying to prevent their deaths would be different from being morally obliged to refrain from killing all other people even if we had both obligations. (shrink)

David Shaw presents a new argument to support the old claim that there is not a significant moral difference between killing and letting die and, by implication, between active and passive euthanasia. He concludes that doctors should not make a distinction between them. However, whether or not killing and letting die are morally equivalent is not as important a question as he suggests. One can justify legal distinctions on non-moral grounds. One might oppose physician- assisted suicide and active euthanasia when (...) performed by doctors on patients whether or not one is in favour of the legalisation of assisted suicide and active euthanasia. Furthermore, one can consider particular actions to be contrary to appropriate professional conduct even in the absence of legal and ethical objections to them. Someone who wants to die might want only a doctor to kill him or to help him to kill himself. However, we are not entitled to everything that we want in life or death. A doctor cannot always fittingly provide all that a patient wants or needs. It is appropriate that doctors provide their expert advice with regard to the performance of active euthanasia but they can and should do so while, qua doctors, they remain hors de combat. (shrink)

Originally published in 1970 this title commemorates the men and ideas that started, inspired and established a pioneer institution in British psychiatry. Based on the impetus of Freudian and related innovations after the First World War, the Tavistock Clinic offered treatment, training and research facilities in the field of neurosis, child guidance and later on group relations. Dr Dicks, who had been associated for nearly forty years with the work and personalities that helped to develop the Tavistock venture, describes the (...) struggles and capacity for survival of the clinic. He shows how, belonging neither to the older classical psychiatry nor to orthodox psychoanalysis, and suspect to both, the Clinic nevertheless became increasingly used by the rest of the profession as a psychotherapeutic resource. Dr Dicks describes the influence of the Tavistock on the medical, psychological and social work scene both before and after the Second World War, and assesses its achievements as a centre of psycho- and socio-dynamic thinking. The Tavistock is shown as a pioneer _sui generis_, launching psychosomatic research and initiating the exciting ventures in social psychiatry associated with the Army in the Second World War. As the Tavistock was the outcome of work with shell-shock victims in the first war, so its offspring, the Institute of Human Relations, was the natural continuation of the military effort in man-management, morale and group dynamic studies. The book includes an account of the inter-relationship between the Clinic, now part of the National Health Service, and the Institute, a private corporation. Still going strong as part of the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust today this is an opportunity to revisit its early history. (shrink)

Coggon’s remarks on a previous paper on active and passive euthanasia elicit a clarification and an elaboration of the argument in support of the claim that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die. The relevant moral duties are different in nature, strength and content. Moreover, not all people who are involved in the relevant situations have the same moral duties. The particular case that is presented in support of the claim that to kill is not the same (...) as to let die is based upon a rejection of consequentialism. (shrink)

For frege, To define a symbol is to show how to do without it. Frege originated the distinction between metalanguage and object language. But he formulates his definitions within the begriffsschrift itself, Not seeing that, According to his own account of them, They go better in the metalanguage.

Purpose. The knowledge influence analysis on the formation process of new anthropological images of man in the contexts of scientific achievements and innovative technologies is the basis of this study. It involves the solution of the following tasks: 1) explication of the ontological content of knowledge in the anthropo-cultural senses of the epoch; 2) analysis of the knowledge influence on the process of forming a new type of man; 3) characteristics of the modern anthropological situation in the context of digital (...) culture; 4) substantiation of interrelation of phatic communication with post-truth society in the dimensions of anthropo-social transformations of the present. Theoretical basis. Ontological content of knowledge determines the anthropo-cultural context of the epoch by forming a system of intellectual, value, social meanings of human life. The assertion of new anthropological types of man is caused by the changes in social and cultural space in the context of the growing influence of achievements in scientific knowledge and technology. Digital revolution as the process of expanding the possibilities of informational-digital reality, the substitution of knowledge for information gives rise to Homo digitalis – the digital man. He focuses on phatic communication, which in its intellectual meaninglessness is commensurate with the anthropological dimensions of post-truth society. Originality. It is substantiated that Homo digitalis is the result of a complex set of heterogeneous effects of scientific knowledge, which in modern post-truth conditions appears as different communicative practices. A condition for the formation of a new anthropological type of man in the perspective of scientific and technological progress is the affirmation of ethical wisdom. Conclusions. Knowledge in the process of evolution of socio-cultural life acquires constitutive significance for the process of formation of anthropological situations that manifest themselves in new images of man. Today, he is commensurate with the demands of digital culture, in which human life practices are increasingly becoming information and digital clusters embedded in the reality of a post-truth society. The means of overcoming the passivity of digital man is the formation of a new anthropological type based on a rethinking of the value system. (shrink)

Originally published in 1970 this title commemorates the men and ideas that started, inspired and established a pioneer institution in British psychiatry. Based on the impetus of Freudian and related innovations after the First World War, the Tavistock Clinic offered treatment, training and research facilities in the field of neurosis, child guidance and later on group relations. Dr Dicks, who had been associated for nearly forty years with the work and personalities that helped to develop the Tavistock venture, describes the (...) struggles and capacity for survival of the clinic. He shows how, belonging neither to the older classical psychiatry nor to orthodox psychoanalysis, and suspect to both, the Clinic nevertheless became increasingly used by the rest of the profession as a psychotherapeutic resource. Dr Dicks describes the influence of the Tavistock on the medical, psychological and social work scene both before and after the Second World War, and assesses its achievements as a centre of psycho- and socio-dynamic thinking. The Tavistock is shown as a pioneer _sui generis_, launching psychosomatic research and initiating the exciting ventures in social psychiatry associated with the Army in the Second World War. As the Tavistock was the outcome of work with shell-shock victims in the first war, so its offspring, the Institute of Human Relations, was the natural continuation of the military effort in man-management, morale and group dynamic studies. The book includes an account of the inter-relationship between the Clinic, now part of the National Health Service, and the Institute, a private corporation. Still going strong as part of the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust today this is an opportunity to revisit its early history. (shrink)

The commonplaces, all grammatically confused, are that ?conditionals? are ternary in structure, have ?antecedents? and conform to the traditional taxonomy. It is maintained en route that ?The bough will not break? is consistent with ?If the bough breaks ??, that there is no logical difference between ?future indicatives? and ?subjunctives?, and that there is a difference between the logic of propositions (e.g. ?The bough broke?) and that of judgments (?The bough will/might/could/should/must/needn't break?).

Now, we can draw a conclusion on the matter of the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's grammar. We have seen that angādhikāra constitutes a very important section of the grammar where the relation of the suffixes and their bases is crucial. We also have observed that the concept of anga cannot be separated from Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's system due to its being a part of many sūtras as well as many paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās. We have also (...) seen that at least three exclusive prayojanas exist for the justification of angādhikāra. Another justification can be given in the form of preventing the double samprasāra $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ a in forms like vavraś which we discussed while determining the limit of angādhikāra. We saw that three important paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās, which are accepted by Patañjali, depend on angādhikāra. Finally we saw that an alternative suggested by Patañjali for angādhikāra is in no way better, but actually defective.Kātyāyana's use of angādhikāra in other sections to counter some objections has been shown too. Patañjali's apparent rejection of angādhikāra on the basis of Kātyāyana's vārtika on ‘angasya’ (6-4-1) is not supported by his own treatment of the subject in other places. So, we conclude that Patañjali did not really intend to refute the angādhikāra and the view which appears in his commentary on 6-4-1 should not be taken as his siddhānta on this matter. Tasmād angādhikāra iti bhagavato gūdho 'bhisandhir iti bhāvah. Naitāni ity ādi grantha $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ ekadeśyuktir iti tātparyam. Nāgeśa, ‘Uddyota’, MB, Vol. 5, p. 273.Thus the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's A $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}$$ ādhyāyī is established. (shrink)

In line with article 3.4 of EC directive 89/381, Keown has presented an ethical case in support of the policy of voluntary, unpaid donation of blood. Although no doubt is cast on the desirability of the policy, that part of Keown's argument which pertains to the suggested laudability of altruism and of its encouragment by social policy is examined and shown to be dubious.

It is urged (1) that geach is correct in his claim ("assertion", "philosophical review", 74, (1965), Page 449) that what he calls 'the frege point' is logically independent of frege's doctrine that sentences are names of objects, And (2) that frege's 'propositions of begriffsschrift' are neither truths nor falsehoods.

The Einstein equations can be written as Fierz-Pauli equations with self-interaction, $W\gamma _{ik} = - G_{ik} + \tfrac{1}{2}g_{ik} g^{mn} G_{mn} - k(T_{ik} - \tfrac{1}{2}g_{ik} g^{mn} T_{mn} )$ together with the covariant Hilbert-gauge condition, $(\gamma _i^h - \tfrac{1}{2}\delta _i^k g^{mn} \gamma _{mn} )_{;k} = 0$ where W denotes the covariant wave operator and G ik the Einstein tensor of the metric g ik collecting all nonlinear terms of Einstein's equations. As is known, there do not, however, exist plane-wave solutions γ ik(z)with (...) g ik Z,i Z,k=0of these equations such that what is essential to the introduction of gravitons is not satisfied in general relativity. This nonexistence corresponds with the uncertainty relation,Δp(Δg*)2(Δx)3≥h hG/ c 3 concerning the total nonlinear gravitational field g *ik =g k +γ k. (shrink)

A discussion of the diffraction and scattering of particles by a grating shows that the experiment discussed by H. Hönl and by L. Rosenfeld in 1965 and again in 1981 does not reveal any contradiction between general relativity and quantum theory. Moreover, these theories, in principle, cannot refute one another because the (weak) principle of equivalence, underlying general relativity theory, entails that gravitation does not alter the laws of microphysics.

The analysis of the measurement of gravitational fields leads to the Rosenfeld inequalities. They say that, as an implication of the equivalence of the inertial and passive gravitational masses of the test body, the metric cannot be attributed to an operator that is defined in the frame of a local canonical quantum field theory. This is true for any theory containing a metric, independently of the geometric framework under consideration and the way one introduces the metric in it. Thus, to (...) establish a local quantum field theory of gravity one has to transit to non-Riemann geometry that contains (beside or instead of the metric) other geometric quantities. From this view, we discuss a Riemann–Cartan and an affine model of gravity and show them to be promising candidates of a theory of canonical quantum gravity. (shrink)

This is a continuation of and a development of a debate between John Keown and me. The issue discussed is whether, in Britain, an unpaid system of blood donation promotes and is justified by its promotion of altruism. Doubt is cast on the notions that public policies can, and, if they can, that they should, be aimed at the promotion and expression of altruism rather than of self-interest, especially that of a mercenary sort. Reflections upon President Kennedy's proposition, introduced into (...) the debate by Keown, that we should ask not what our country can do for us but what we can do for our country is pivotal to this casting of doubt. A case is made for suggesting that advocacy along the lines which Keown presents of an exclusive reliance on a voluntary, unpaid system of blood donation encourages inappropriate attitudes towards the provision of health care. Perhaps, it is suggested, and the suggestion represents, on my part, a change of mind as a consequence of the debate, a dual system of blood provision might be preferable. (shrink)

Julian Le Grand's case for saying that it would be equitable if smokers and smokers alone were to pay the costs of smoking-related health care is considered and found to be deficient.